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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida faces ongoing growth pressures that burden available infrastructure. In 1972, the Florida Legislature developed comprehensive land use
planning laws to address these problems.' In 1975, the legislature passed
the Local Government Comprehensive Planning Act of 1975,2 which
required comprehensive land use plans. The 1985 legislature substantially
amended the 1975 comprehensive planning act and renamed it the Florida
Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development
Regulation Act ("Growth Management Act").3 Among other things, the
1985 Growth Management Act requires local comprehensive plans to require
adequate infrastructure to accommodate development.4 This requirement
is called "concurrency."
This article addresses the development of infrastructure concurrency
requirements. Particularly, this article examines whether delays of, or bars
to, property development due to concurrency requirements constitute a
compensable taking of private property rights. The Bert J. Harris, Jr.,
Private Property Rights Protection Act ("Harris Act"), 5 adopted by the
legislature in 1995, might substantially expand local government exposure
for those acts which fall short of a taking of all rights in a property. This
article concludes by considering the potential impacts of the Harris Act.
IX. CONCURRENCY

The Growth Management Act sets general, statewide, regional, and
local requirements for land use planning. A key component of the Growth
Management Act mandates sufficient, concurrent infrastructure before
development is authorized. 6
The Growth Management Act states in pertinent part that "[i]t is the
intent of the Legislature that public facilities and services needed to support
development shall be available concurrent with the impacts of such development."7 According to the FloridaAdministrative Code, public facilities and

1. Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972, 1972 Fla. Laws ch. 72-295.
2. 1975 Fla. Laws ch. 75-205 (current version at FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.3211 (1995)).
3. State Comprehensive Plan, 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-57 (current version at FLA. STAT.
§§ 163.3161-.3243 (1995)).
4. See FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177-.3178, .3180, .3202 (1995).
5. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)).
6. FLA. STAT. § 163.3202(2)(g).
7. Id. § 163.3177(10)(h).
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services include: roads; sanitary sewer; solid waste; drainage; potable water;
parks and recreation; mass transit, if applicable; and public transit.'
In addition, any local government may extend the concurrency
requirement so that it applies to other public facilities within its jurisdiction,
such as schools. 9 Each local government also must adopt a Concurrency
Management System ("CMS"),'0 which must include a monitoring system
and provide that concurrency be determined for a project by the time a
permit for containing a specific plan of development is applied for.
Concurrency timing is set out for each public facility. The most
restrictive timing is for sanitary sewer, solid waste, drainage, and potable
water facilities. To obtain a permit for these facilities, the local government
is required to make the necessary facilities and services available to the new
development at the time of issuance of a certificate of occupancy or its
equivalent." Another way the local government may obtain a permit is by
showing, at the time the permit is issued, that the necessary facilities and
services are guaranteed, through an enforceable development agreement, to
be in place at the time of the certificate of occupancy.'
The least
restrictive timing requirement is for parks and recreation facilities. These
facilities may
be unavailable for as long as five years after the issuance of
3
permit.'
a
14
The timing requirement for roads is between the first two standards.
Many exceptions, however, may apply.' 5 Generally, the required timing
is: 1) at the time the permit is issued, the roads are in place or under
construction; 2) the permit is issued subject to the condition that the roads
are scheduled to be in place or under actual construction not more than three

8. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(2)(a) (1995).
9. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(2)(b).
10. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055.
11. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(3)(a)l.
12. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(3)(a)2.
13. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(2)(b). The FloridaAdministrative Code states:
A development order or permit is issued subject to the conditions that the
necessary facilities and services needed to serve the new development are
scheduled to be in place or under actual construction not more than one year
after issuance of a certificate of occupancy or its functional equivalent as
provided in the adopted local government 5-year schedule of capital improve-

ments.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(3)(b)2.a. (1995).

This section of the Florida
Administrative Code is derived from § 163.3180(2)(b) of the FloridaStatutes.
14. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(2)(c).
15. See id. § 163.3180(5).
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years after issuance of a certificate of occupancy, as provided in the fiveyear schedule of capital improvements;1 6 or 3) at the time of issuance of
a permit, the roads are the subject of a binding agreement which requires the
be in place or under actual construction after no more than three
roads to
7
years.'
There are numerous exceptions. A major statewide growth management policy promotes compact urban development.' 8 Concurrency, as
applied to roads, works against this policy. The more the population is
spread out, the less congestion exists. Legislation in 1993 created formal
roadway concurrency exceptions to try to solve this problem.' 9 These
exceptions are either area-specific or project-specific20 and are as follows.
Exception One: Urban Redevelopment Project. A proposed urban
redevelopment project located within an "Existing Urban Service Area," as
established in the local comprehensive land use plan, is not subject to the
concurrency requirements for up to 110% of the roadway impacts generated
by prior development.2 ' These projects are approved even if the redevelopment reduces the level of service below the adopted standard. 2
Exception Two: De Minimis Project. A proposed development may
be deemed to have de minimis impact and may not be subject to concurrency, so long as the additional impacts do not significantly degrade the
existing level of service and the project is not very dense or intense.23 The
cumulative impact of all de minimis development must be monitored and
can exceed no more than three percent of the maximum service volume at
the adopted level of service if the road is over capacity.24
Exception Three: Long-term Transportation CMS. This exception
formalizes a ten-year to fifteen-year plan.25 The Florida Department of
Community Affairs ("DCA") approved such a plan for Pasco County, where
roads are severely overloaded. To correct existing deficiencies on roads and
to set priorities for reducing the backlog on roads, local governments are

16. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(3)(c)2. (1995).

17. Id.
18. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(8).
19. Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act
Amendments, 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-206 (codified as amended in scattered sections of FLA.
STAT. ch. 163 (1995)).
20. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b).
21. Id. § 163.3180(8)(b).
22. Id. § 163.3180(5)(b).
23. Id. § 163.3180(6).

24. Id.
25. FLA. STAT.

§ 163.3180(9).
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authorized to adopt a long-term CMS with a planning period of up to ten
years.26 The comprehensive plan must: 1) designate specific areas where
significant backlogs presently exist; 2) provide a financially feasible system
to ensure that existing deficiencies are corrected within the ten-year period;
and 3) demonstrate the roads required to correct existing deficiencies, as
well as to accommodate new development.27 The comprehensive plan also
must state that a plan amendment shall be required to eliminate, defer, or
delay construction of any road which is needed to maintain the adopted
level-of-service standard, and which is listed in the long-term schedule of
capital improvements, if established." Local governments with a severe
backlog may request DCA approval for a planning period of up to fifteen
years for establishing a long-term CMS. 29
Exception Four: Transportation Concurrency Management Area
("TCMA"). This provision promotes infill development or redevelopment
within selected urban areas and it allows the level of service to be averaged
within a TCMA.3 ° A TCMA is a compact geographic area with existing
or proposed multiple, viable alternative travel paths or modes for common
trips.3 A local government must justify the level of service chosen, show
how urban infill or redevelopment would be promoted by the TCMA, and
demonstrate how mobility will be accomplished.3 2
Exception Five: Transportation Concurrency Exception Areas
("TCEA "). There are three types of TCEAs. The first type is intended to
promote urban infill development in built-up areas which already have roads
in place.33 In this type of TCEA, no more than ten percent of the land
within an infill TCEA may be developable vacant land.34 Specific
development density and intensity thresholds also must be met.35 The
second type of TCEA promotes urban redevelopment and may be located
only in an area which contains no more than forty percent developable
vacant land.3 6 The third type of TCEA is intended to promote develop-

26. Id. § 163.3180(9)(a).

27. Id.
28. Id. § 163.3180(10).
29. Id. § 163.3180(9)(b).
30. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(7).

31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. § 163.3180(5)(b); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)l. (1995).
34. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)l.a. (1995).

35. Id. at r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)l.b.
36. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)2. (1995).
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ment in central business districts designated for downtown revitalization.37
There must be data and analysis supporting the creation of these exception
areas, where fairly dense and intense development may be allowed. 8 Dade
and Broward Counties are trying to designate TCEAs.
39 This
Exception Six: Projects that Promote Public Transportation.
is a project-specific exception. To reduce the adverse impact of transportation concurrency, local governments may exempt projects that promote
public transportation by establishing policies in the comprehensive plan for
granting such exceptions. 40 Examples of such projects are office buildings
that incorporate transit terminals or fixed rail stations. To receive the
benefit of this exception, local comprehensive plans also must demonstrate
supporting data and analysis showing consideration of the project impact on
limited access highways and establish how a project will qualify.4'
Exception Seven: Part-time Projects. Another project-specific
exception is for part-time projects. 42 This section excepts developments
located within urban infill, urban redevelopment, existing urban service, or
downtown revitalization areas which pose only special part-time demands
on roads.4 3 Examples of these types of developments include stadiums,
performing arts centers, racetracks, and fairgrounds.
Exception Eight: Private Contributions. The comprehensive planning
statute also entitles a local government to allow a landowner to proceed with
development of a specific parcel of land notwithstanding a failure of the
development to satisfy transportation concurrency. 44 This provision seeks
to limit local government liability for temporary takings due to development
delays. The local government must have an adopted comprehensive plan in
compliance with DCA standards.45 The local government also must
provide a means by which the landowner will be assessed a fair share of the
cost of providing the transportation facilities necessary to serve the proposed
development. 46 On the other hand, the landowner must make a binding

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(a)3. (1995).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(6)(b)2. (1995).
FLA. STAT. § 163.3164(28); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(7) (1995).
FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(b).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.0055(7) (1995).
FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(5)(c).
Id.
Id. § 163.3180(11).
Id. § 163.3180(11)(a).
Id. § 163.3180(11)(d).
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commitment to the local government to pay the fair share of the cost of
providing the transportation facilities to serve the proposed development.47
Concurrency standards authorize local governments to condition or bar
development. The local government may allow growth only when sufficient
infrastructure exists. The following section addresses when a development
moratorium, based on a lack of concurrency, may be a compensable taking.
III. THE TAKING BACKGROUND
In the early 1900s, courts began to struggle with the tension between
the desire of local governments to regulate the use of land and the

constitutional property rights of landowners.

Few localities previously

adopted zoning regulations. Such regulations tend to reduce the value of at

least some property. There was much uncertainty as to whether they were
constitutional. In response, the United States Department of Commerce
encouraged the adoption of zoning codes through its promulgation in 1921
of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, which provided a method for
states to adopt statutes empowering local governments to enact zoning
regulations."
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the UnitedStates Constitution
provide the bases for these issues. The Fifth Amendment guarantees that
citizens' private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.4 9 The Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . .. ."'
The Florida Constitution also guarantees all natural persons the right
to "acquire, possess and protect property" and further provides that no
person will be deprived of property without due process of law." Article
X, section six of the FloridaConstitution is complementary to the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the UnitedStates Constitution. It provides that
"[n]o private property shall be taken except for a public purpose and with
full compensation therefor paid to each owner...., 52
47. FLA. STAT. § 163.3180(11)(e).
48. See Kenneth Hart, Note, Comprehensive Land Use Plans and the Consistency
Requirement, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 766, 768 n.6 (1974).
49. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
50. Id. amend. XIV.

51. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
52. Id. art. X, § 6.
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A review of the key cases in this area is instructive. In Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,53 a Pennsylvania statute prohibited coal mining that
caused the subsidence of any structure used for human habitation. The
statute admittedly destroyed previously existing property and contract rights
of the coal mining companies. The court stated that
The general rule, at least, is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire
to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.4
The Court held that the statute caused an unconstitutional taking and that the
coal mining companies should be compensated.55
The next key case in this area addressed a zoning ordinance. The
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.5" held that zoning regulations which reduced the potential value of property do not constitute an
impermissible taking of property."
In 1922, Euclid adopted a zoning
ordinance.5 8 A portion of the plaintiff's property was zoned residential and
the plaintiff wanted to develop the entire property for industrial use.5 9 The
evidence showed that the property was worth $10,000 per acre as industrial,
but only $2500 per acre as residential.' The Court found that the zoning
restrictions were permitted under the police power of the state to protect the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens.61
A seminal New York case involved a situation similar to a concurrency
moratorium. In Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,62 a local
ordinance which prohibited development until essential services of public
sanitary sewers, drainage facilities, parks and recreation facilities, roads, and
firehouses were available, was deemed not to be a taking.63 The court

53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
54. Id. at 415-16 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 416.

56. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
57. Id. at 397.
58. Id. at 379.

59. Id. at 383.
60. Id. at 384.
61. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.

62. 285 N.E.2d 291 (N.Y. 1972).
63. Id. at 305.
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669

found that the purpose of the ordinance was not exclusionary, but to provide
for orderly growth. 64 Even though the concurrency regulations might have
the effect of restricting development of up to eighteen years, the ordinance
was not found to have caused a taking because the restriction was temporary
and served the public good.65
Subsequent United States Supreme Court cases undermine Ramapo.
The Court in Penn Central TransportationCo. v. City of New York,6 held
that an historic preservation ordinance, which prohibited development in a
manner requested by the developer, as applied to Penn Station, did not
constitute a taking, since all use of the property was not denied because the
statute made air rights transferrable.67 The Court closely examined whether
the landowner would receive a reasonable return on its investment, using the
phrase "investment backed expectations. ' ' 8
Temporary takings, which are most applicable to cases dealing with
concurrency, were considered in FirstEnglish EvangelicalLutheran Church
of Glendale v. Los Angeles County.69 In 1957, the church purchased land
on which it operated a campground called "Lutherglen" and a retreat for
handicapped children.70 The land is located in a canyon along the banks
of a creek which operates as a natural drainage channel. 7' In 1978, a flood
destroyed the buildings on the property.Y2 As a result of the flood, Los
Angeles County adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction
of any building in an interim flood protection area, including the church's
property. 3 The church immediately filed suit seeking damages.74 The
Court held that landowners were entitled to damages for the t~mporary taking.' The substantive holding of the Court was that when the government's
activities deprive a landowner of all use of property, no subsequent action
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the regulation was effective.76

64. Id. at 297.
65. Id. at 301-02.
66. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

67. Id. at 138.
68. Id. at 136.
69. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).

70. Id. at 307.
71. Id.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
First EvangelicalLutheran Church of Glendale, 482 U.S. at 308.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 321.
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Contrast this holding to the holding in Ramapo, in which the court held
that a "temporary" moratorium of up to eighteen years was not a compensable taking.77 The First Evangelical Church of Glendale Court would have
found that ordinance to cause a temporary taking.
Another landmark Supreme Court case is the decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council.7 In 1986, developer David Lucas purchased
two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island near Charleston,
South Carolina.7 9 Lucas intended to construct single family residences on
the lots.80 Two years later, in reaction to the devastation caused by
Hurricane Hugo, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront
Management82 Act ("BMA"),"1 which prohibited construction of homes on
Lucas' lots.
Lucas' suit claimed that although the BMA was a lawful exercise of
South Carolina's police power, the legislation effectively extinguished his
property's value, entitling him to compensation irrespective of whether the
legislature had acted in furtherance of legitimate police power objectives.83
The trial court agreed and ordered that Lucas be compensated in the amount
of $1,232,287.50.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and found
"'that the [BMA was] properly and validly designed to preserve... South
Carolina's beaches,"' a threatened public resource. 85 Since the regulation
was designed to prevent serious public harm, the state court reasoned that
no compensation was due the landowner under the state's takings clause. 6
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in the case.
With respect to the merits of the regulatory taking claim, the Court noted
that there are at least two categories of regulatory actions which are
compensable without any inquiry into the public interest advanced in support
of the restraint.8 7 The first category of permissible regulatory takings
occurs when a property owner suffers a physical invasion of her property. 8

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Id. at 1006-07.
Id. at 1007.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250-360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995).
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1007.
Id. at 1009.

84. Id.
85. Id. at 1009-10 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 404
S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991), rev'd, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)).

86. Id.
87. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
88. Id.
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The second occurs when a regulation denies all economically beneficial use
of land. 9 The Court stated that the only exception to the second category
is when the regulatorily-proscribed use would amount to a nuisance at
common law.90 The Court also noted that it was highly unlikely that
common law principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable
or productive improvements on Lucas' land.9 ' Accordingly, the Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its decision.92
The most recent Supreme Court case in this area is Dolan v. City of
Tigard.9 3 In Dolan, an operator of an electric and plumbing supply
business wished to raze an existing building and replace it with a larger
structure.94 The city imposed conditions requiring that the landowner
dedicate ten percent of the property for flood plain and improvement of
storm drainage, and dedicate a fifteen-foot strip for a pedestrian and bike
pathway.95 The Supreme Court held that this action constituted a taking
because there must be a "rough proportionality" between dedication
requirements and the impact of the development.96 The Supreme Court
refused to hold that rough proportionality did not exist in this case, but
rather, that it had not been proven.97 To prove "rough proportionality," a
local government must show some sort of individualized determination that
any required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of
the proposed development." The burden of persuasion on this issue rests
on the government. 99
Recent Supreme Court of Florida cases on this issue also are instruc° the court
tive. In Joint Ventures, Inc. v. Department of Transportation,"
stated that government must pay for property under two circumstances:
[W]hen it confiscates private property for common use under its power
of eminent domain[, and] ... when it regulates private property under

89. Id.
90. Id. at 1022.
91. Id. at 1024.
92. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032.
93. 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).

94. Id. at 2313.
95. Id. at 2314.
96. Id. at 2319, 2321.

97. Id. at 2321.
98. Dolan, 114 S. Ct. at 2322.

99. Id. at 2319.
100. 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990).
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its police power in such a manner that the regulation effectively
deprives the owner of the economically viable use of the property,
thereby unfairly imposing the burden of providing for the public welfare
upon the affected owner.""1
The court noted that "[a]lIthough regulation under the police power will
always interfere to some degree with property use, compensation must be
paid . . . when that interference deprives the owner of the substantial

"[Wlhen compensation is
economic use of his or her property."'"
claimed due to governmental regulation of property, the appropriate inquiry
is directed
to the extent of the interference or deprivation of economic
3
' 10

use."

Joint Ventures owned over eight acres of vacant land adjacent to Dale
Mabry Highway in Tampa.1°4 The owner agreed to sell the property
contingent upon the buyer's ability to obtain the necessary development
permits.0 5 The Florida Department of Transportation ("FDOT") then
determined that six-and-a-half acres of this vacant tract was needed for
stormwater drainage associated with a planned highway widening."° In
November 1985, the FDOT recorded a map of reservation, which precluded
the issuance of development permits for the property. 7 At an administrative hearing, Joint Ventures contested the FDOT's reservation and the
V 8
hearing officer found in favor of the FDOT.
On appeal, "Joint Ventures argued that the moratorium imposed by [the
applicable Florida Statute] amounted to a taking because the statute
deprived [Joint Ventures] of substantial beneficial use of its property."' 9
In opposition, the FDOT contended that the statute was not a taking, but a
mere regulation and valid exercise of its police power."' The court made
short work of the FDOT's claims, stating:
If landowners were permitted to build in a transportation corridor during
the period of DOT's preacquisition planning, the cost of acquisition

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id.; accord Palm Beach County v. Tessler, 538 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1986).
Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 623.
Id.
Id.

107. Id.
108. Id. at 623-24.
109. Joint Ventures, 563 So. 2d at 624.
110. Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss2/4

12

19961

Durden et al.: Waiting for the Go: Concurrency, Takings, and the Property Rights

Durden / Layman / Ansbacher

might be increased. Rather than supporting a "regulatory" characterization, these circumstances expose the statutory scheme as a thinly veiled
attempt to "acquire" land by avoiding the legislatively mandated
procedural and substantive protections of chapters 73 and 74.111

The court further stated, "[w]e perceive no valid distinction between
'freezing' property in this fashion and deliberately attempting to depress
land values in anticipation of eminent
domain proceedings. Such action has
' 2
been consistently prohibited."
Joint Ventures generated a plethora of subsequent cases in which the
Fifth and First District Courts of Appeal conflicted as to whether maps of
reservation create presumptive takings.!13 The Supreme Court of Florida
resolved this question in Tampa-HillsboroughCounty ExpresswayAuthority
v. A.G.W.S. Corp.114 In A.G.W.S., the Expressway Authority filed a map
of reservation over vacant land while Joint Ventures was pending." 5 The
property owners claimed that this action amounted to a temporary taking." 6 The circuit court agreed, granting the landowners' motion for
7
summary judgment on liability."
In a sharply divided opinion, the Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed the decision of the trial court."' The appellate court also
certified to the Supreme Court of Florida the question of whether all owners
of lands affected by reservation maps are entitled to per se takings
judgments." 9 In answering the certified question, the supreme court held
that Joint Ventures did not create a per se taking standard.' 20 It further
held that a landowner must show that the map of reservation deprived
substantially all economically beneficial or productive use of land before a
taking has occurred.''

111. Id. at 625.
112. Id. at 626.
113. See Department of Transp. v. Miccosukee Village Shopping Ctr., 621 So. 2d 516
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Department of Transp. v. Lake Beulah, 617 So. 2d 1089 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
114. 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
115. Tampa-Hillsborough County Expressway Auth. v. A.G.W.S. Corp., 608 So. 2d 52,
54 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), quashed, 640 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1994).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.at 52.
119. Id.
120. A.G.W.S., 640 So. 2d at 58.
121. Id.
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The Supreme Court of Florida's subsequent decision in Palm Beach
County v. Wright" followed A.G.W.S. The trial court and the Fourth
District Court of Appeal struck down a bar of land use activities under a
comprehensive plan that would impede roadway construction in designated
transportation corridors." 2 Both lower courts held that Joint Ventures
supported a finding of a temporary taking. 24
The state supreme court, however, reversed, holding that the case was
distinguishable from Joint Ventures on several points. 25 Principally, the
court held that the thoroughfare map conditioned development, but did not
completely bar it.116 Additionally, the reservation map was considered
only a flexible guidance tool.2 7
A seminal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision provides a good
checklist for determining whether all economically viable use of property
has been taken under Florida Law. Reahard v. Lee County128 suggests that
a taking claim requires one to analyze the economic impact on the owner
and the extent to which the regulation interferes with the owner's investment
backed expectations. Factors to consider are: 1) the history of the property;
2) the history of development; 3) the history of zoning and regulation; 4)
whether the development changed when title passed; 5) the present nature
and extent of the property; 6) whether the expectations of the landowner are
reasonable under state common law; 7) reasonable expectations of neighbors; and 8) the amount of diminution of investment-backed expectations of
the landowner. 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF WHETHER CONCURRENCY'S PROHIBITION ON
DEVELOPMENT OF PROPERTY REPRESENTS A TAKING
When property cannot be developed because of concurrency regulations, the following "takings" issues should be considered:
1. Analyze whether the concurrency ordinance provides for at least
some development. Some concurrency ordinances allow for minimal
development, such as single family homes, even though concurrency levels

122. 641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
123. Id. at 51.
124. Id. at 51-52.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 54.
Id. at 53.
Wright, 641 So. 2d at 53.
968 F.2d 1131 (11th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1136.
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of service may be exceeded. If the development allowed is reasonable, it
is less likely that a taking has occurred.
2. Analyze the reduction in value of the property and the investment
backed expectations of the owner. If the value of the property analyzed is
tremendously reduced and the investment backed expectations of the owner
are reasonable, it is more likely that a taking has occurred.
3. Determine how long the development will be prohibited by the
concurrency regulations. The longer the prohibition, the more likely that a
taking has occurred.
4. Consider whether the concurrency problem is related solely to the
owner's project or to the government's failure to provide for growth. The
greater the impact that the individual owner's project has on the services, the
less likely it is that a taking has occurred.
5. Analyze whether the unavailable services are closely related to
health, such as availability of water and sewer, or "softer services" such as
recreation. The more closely the unavailable services are related to health,
the less likely it is that a taking has occurred.
V. THE HARRiS AcT
In 1995, the Florida Legislature passed, and Governor Lawton Chiles
signed into law, the Bert J. Harris, Jr., Private Property Rights Protection
Act. 3 ' The Harris Act might benefit landowners when imposition of
concurrency regulations creates less than a complete taking of property. 3 '
The Harris Act creates rights for property owners for those governmental
actions which "inordinately burden" property.'
A cause of action under
the Harris Act does not require a taking of all compensable rights in the
133
property.
The Harris Act operates prospectively to those government actions
occurring after the end of the 1995 legislative session, or after May 11,
1995.13' No law, rule, or ordinance that exists, or has been previously
noticed for adoption, is covered. 35 Later amendments to existing laws,

130. 1995 Fla. Laws ch. 95-181 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 70.001 (1995)).
131. Id.

132. Ch. 95-181, § 1(2), 1995 Fla. Laws. at 1652.
133. See, e.g., Reahard, 968 F.2d at 1136 (stating Florida's prior standard that
compensation is due only where governmental action "takes" all or substantially all property
rights).
134. Ch. 95-181, § 1(12), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1657.
135. Id.
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rules, and ordinances, however, fall under the Harris Act.136 The Harris
Act also covers actions by all local, state, and regional governments, 37 but
it does not affect federal acts or those actions delegated from the federal
government.' 38 In addition, the Harris Act does not cover actions that
abate nuisances, temporary impacts, or impacts caused by Harris Act relief
issued to other landowners.
The first two limitations are products of taking jurisprudence. Takings
generally are compensable when they effect a public good, but not when
they prevent a harm. Conversely, the temporary impact bar differs from the
common law entitlement to compensation for temporary takings. 39 This
should substantially limit the effect of the Harris Act on moratoria.
Transportation-based development bars are lifted once the infrastructure is
available.
The Harris Act also exempts maintenance and expansion of transportation facilities."'4
This also should limit the Harris Act's impact on
concurrency moratoria. As stated above, property owner claims under traffic
corridor expansions constitute a major portion of Florida's taking law.
Recent case law regarding development exactions indicates issues that might
otherwise arise.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,141 the United States Supreme Court held
that a city could not require a developer to provide a public greenway and
bike path. The Court held that the dedications far exceeded the degree of
public infrastructure impact shown for the proposed development.' 42 The
Court also held that the local government must demonstrate both an
"essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" between the development and
the exaction. 143 Failing that, the government might be liable for a taking.
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Department ofTransportation v. Heckman,'" reviewed Dolan in considering the FDOT's appeal of
an inverse condemnation judgment. The trial court held FDOT liable for the
City of Oakland Park's requirement that the appellee property owners grant
a seven-foot wide right of way across their property in return for a waiver
136.
137.
138.
139.
U.S. 304
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id. § 1(3)(c), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
Id.
See First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County, 482
(1987) (holding temporary taking of all rights can give rise to compensation).
Ch. 95-181, § 1(10), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1656.
114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994).
Id. at 2322.
Id. at 2319, 2321.
644 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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of development and platting requirements. The city then conveyed the
parcel to FDOT for the expansion of U.S. Highway 1. The appellate court
cited to Dolan, but did not find any agency between FDOT and the city.' 45
Its reversal was, therefore, wholly unrelated to the merits.
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal considered another inverse
condemnation case in Sarasota County v. Ex."4 The Exs claimed that the
county had no authority to require a right of way grant in exchange for a
permit. The Ex court did not reach the merits either. Instead, it held that
the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 4 7
Roadway expansions are prevalent causes of development exactions.
One can reasonably expect concurrency moratoria where already overburdened roadway corridors are subjects of further development requests.
Without the exception, limitations based on traffic concurrency would be a
ripe area for litigation.
A. ProtectedRights
The Harris Act protects the "existing use" of property.' An "existing use" is "an actual, present use or activity on the real property,t 149 or
such reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land uses which are suitable
for the subject real property and compatible with adjacent land uses and
which have created an existing fair market value in the property [that
is] greater than the fair market value of the actual, present use or
activity on the real property."'
The first definition is relatively simple to determine. The second definition,
however, merges several criteria to create a new standard. There is no direct
authority on which to base a determination of when property use is
reasonably foreseeable and non-speculative. Former Florida Department of
Community Affairs Secretary Tom Pelham suggests that local governments
should draft guidelines for determining such uses under the pertinent
comprehensive land use plan or zoning code.'

145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 530-31.
645 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 10 (citing FLA. STAT. § 95.14 (1995)).
Ch. 95-181, § 1(3)(b), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Thomas Pelham, Coping with the Private Property Rights Protection Act, FLA.
PLANNING

(Fla. Chapter Am.Planning Ass'n), July-Aug. 1995, at 1, 15.
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Pelham also notes that the second prong of the "existing use" definition
The Harris Act fails to answer the
requires appraisers to speculate.'
question of how one determines whether the reasonably foreseeable, nonspeculative land use has a higher fair market value than does a current use.
B.

Vested Rights

The Harris Act contains three standards to determine a vested right to
estoppel,
a specific use.'53 A right may vest under common law equitable
54
substantive due process, or a state vested rights statute.1
Florida courts have stated that equitable estoppel bars the government
from rescinding a vested right held by a property owner who has: "(1) in
good faith (2) upon some act or omission of the government (3) ... made
such a substantial change in position or has incurred such extensive
obligations and expenses that it would be highly inequitable.., to destroy
the right .... "155
The Growth Management Act, most likely to apply to local concurrency issues, contains the following vested rights provision:
Nothing in this act shall limit or modify the rights of any person to
complete any development that has been authorized as a development
of regional impact pursuant to chapter 380 or who has been issued a
final local development order and development has commenced and is
continuing in good faith.'56
One article on the Harris Act notes that substantive due process allows
courts to develop a standard that goes beyond traditional estoppel. 7
These commentators cite an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
support of this proposition. 5
Thomas Pelham recommends that local governments draft ordinances
defining "vested rights."'5 9 He also suggests that doing so may provide
152. Id. at 15.

153. Ch. 95-181, § l(3)(a), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
154. Id.
155. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10, 15 (Fla. 1976)

(quoting Sakolsky v. City of Coral Gables, 151 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1963)).
156. FLA. STAT. § 163.3167(8).
157. David L. Powell et al., Florida'sNew Law to Protect Private Property Rights, 69
FLA. B.J. 12, 14 (Oct. 1995).
158. Id. at 14, 17 n.17 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Town of Highland Beach, 18
F.3d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994), vacated, 42 F.3d 626 (1lth Cir. 1994)).
159. Pelham, supra note 151, at 15.
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a reasonable analysis of the property rights impacts of the new regulation. 60 Local vested rights ordinance standards do not create vested rights
under the Harris Act. 161 Most local government codes already contain
vested rights provisions. Those which do not, should. The Harris Act
requires examination of vested rights. 62 The local definition might better
allow a court to analyze whether regulation is compensable. This would be
so regardless of the definition's direct applicability.
C. InordinateBurdens
The Harris Act contains two alternative standards to determine
inordinate burdens. Under the first standard, the landowner must show: 1)
the government action so restricted existing uses or a vested use that the
property owner cannot realize its use or vested use of the property; 2) the
63
loss is permanent; and 3) the loss must affect the entire property.
The second test requires a landowner to show that the government
action caused the property to bear a disproportionate share of regulatory
burden. A governmental action can result in a claim because the landowner
bears too great a share of a burden that the government imposed for the
good of the general public."6
D. Implementing The HarrisAct
The Harris Act requires the injured property owner to notify the
offending governmental entity within one year. 65 The government then
66
has 180 days to issue a good faith settlement offer.'
One commentator notes that appropriate settlement offers fall into one
of two categories: 1) compensation for the lost value or 2) enactment of an
exception to the governmental action that devalued the property. 67

160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Ch. 95-181, § 1(3)(a), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652.
Id.
Id. § 1(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1653.

164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id. § 1(11), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1656-57.
Ch. 95-181, § 1(4)(c), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1653.
Robert C. Downie, Property Rights: Will Exceptions Become the Rule?, 69
B.J. 69, 70 (Nov. 1995) (explaining Ch. 95-181, § 1(4)(c), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1653).
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A property owner may sue in circuit court if no settlement is
reached. 6 ' The procedure is parallel to a takings case. 6 9 The court
first determines if an inordinate
burden occurred. 7 If so, then a jury
7
determines compensation.'1
Attorney's fees awards' standards differ from those applicable in
takings litigation. Condemnation statutes 72 generally entitle landowners
to reasonable legal fees. 73 The government almost never is entitled to
recover fees. 7 4 The Harris Act entitles a landowner to fees if the local
government did not issue a good faith offer.'7 5 The government is entitled
176
to fees if the landowner rejected a good faith offer.
E.

The Attorney General's Opinion

As of January 1996, no reported court decisions have expressly
addressed the Harris Act. Nonetheless, the Florida Attorney General issued
17
an instructive opinion regarding the Act's scope. 1
St. Johns County asked the Attorney General whether the Harris Act
confers rights on owners of property that is indirectly affected by a
governmental action or regulation. 7 The answer was that the Act does
not. 79 The opinion focused on the Harris Act's definition of "inordinate
burden."' 180 The term refers to actions that "'directly restricted or limited
the use of real property ....
The opinion also contends that courts should narrowly construe the
Harris Act. 82 The Harris Act constitutes a waiver of sovereign immuni-

168. Ch. 95-181, § 1(5)(b), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1654.
169. FLA. STAT. § 73.071 (1995).
170. Ch. 95-181, § 1(6)(a), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1655.
171. Id. § 1(6)(b).
172. FLA. STAT. chs. 73, 74 (1995).
173. FLA. STAT. §§ 73.091-.092 (1995).
174. A local government is limited to rights under § 57.105(1) to seek attorney's fees
for defending a frivolous claim. See FLA. STAT. § 57.105(1) (1995).
175. Ch. 95-181, § 1(6)(c)2., 1995 Fla. Laws at 1655.
176. Id. § 1(6)(c)1., 1995 Fla. Laws at 1655.
177. 95-78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 7, 1995), availablein WL, FL-AG Directory, 1995 WL
750474.

178. Id.
179.
180.
181.
182.
750474.

Id.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Ch. 95-181, § 1(3)(e), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1652).
95-78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 7, 1995), availablein WL, FL-AG Directory, 1995 WL
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ty."8 The opinion states "like a waiver of sovereign immunity, any
ambiguity in the provisions of the act should be construed against an award
of damages and such damages should be awarded only when an award
appears consistent with the Legislature's intent."' 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida in Palm Beach County v. Wright"s5
limited property owners' ability to prove that transportation related
development limitations constitute compensable takings.'8 6 A property
owner may demonstrate entitlement to compensation. The owner must meet
an exacting factual burden of proof to do so.
The Harris Act, on the other hand, likely will have limited impact on
private property rights under concurrency. The Harris Act only applies to
applications of statutes, rules, and ordinances enacted after May 11, 1995.
Concurrency requirements date from the 1985 growth management
legislation. A concurrency moratorium probably would not fall under the
Harris Act.
Nonetheless, if one can demonstrate that a concurrency moratorium is
of general application, one might argue that the Harris Act applies. In
Board of County Commissioners of Brevard County v. Snyder,'87 the
Supreme Court of Florida held that quasi-legislative rezonings are of a
generalized nature-applying to a substantial number of properties.' 88
Quasi-judicial rezonings apply only to a small number of parcels or
landowners' 8 9
The Harris Act does not define the term "application." The state
supreme court's use of the word in Snyder might help:
[R]ezoning actions which have an impact on a limited number of
persons or property owners, on identifiable parties and interests, where
the decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct
alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the decision can be

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Id.
Id. (citing Arnold v. Shumpert, 217 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1968)).
641 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 1994).
Id. at 54.
627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993).
Id. at 474.
Id.
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functionally viewed aspolicy application,ratherthan policy setting, are

in the nature of ... quasi-judicial action ....

19

Accordingly, one might allege that a general concurrency moratorium
is quasi-legislative. It does not "apply" generalized law as might a quasijudicial action. Therefore, the Harris Act arguably would apply.
The Attorney General's opinion interpreting the Harris Act indicates
that this view might not prevail. Attorney General Butterworth noted that
the Harris Act is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity.'
He concluded 19that
any ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of sovereign immuni2
ty

Another exemption that might apply relates to maintenance and
expansion of transportation facilities.'9 3 Concurrency moratoria address
the opposite issue. One might claim that the exemption excludes concurrency moratoria because it only expressly addresses growth and
maintenance.
The Harris Act might lessen the burden of proof that property owners
must meet to obtain compensation for concurrency moratoria. Court
interpretations will control the degree of impact. Florida's continued
population growth puts increased burdens on extant infrastructure. Thus, the
scope of the Harris Act implementation or concurrency might be sweeping.

190. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Snyder v. Board of County Comm'rs, 595 So. 2d
65, 78 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1991), quashed, 627 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1993)).
191. 95-78 Op. Att'y Gen. (Dec. 7, 1995), available in WL, FL-AG Directory, 1995 WL
750474.
192. Id.
193. Ch. 95-81, § 1(10), 1995 Fla. Laws at 1656.
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